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Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments [Game theory]
Polak, Ben
  • Educação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::Economia
  • Presents a class that analyzes some games using a new solution concept created by the Professor and students, subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). The first game involves players' trusting that others will not make mistakes. It has three Nash equilibria but only one is consistent with backward induction. The other two Nash equilibria are not subgame perfect: each fails to induce Nash in a subgame. The second game involves a matchmaker sending a couple on a date. There are three Nash equilibria in the dating subgame. The Professor construct three corresponding subgame perfect equilibria of the whole game by rolling back each of the equilibrium payoffs from the subgame. Finally, the Professor analyze a game in which a firm has to decide whether to invest in a machine that will reduce its costs of production
Issue Date: 
  • 12-Nov-2007
  • 5-Apr-2010
  • 5-May-2010
  • 5-May-2010
  • 5-May-2010
Yale University, Open Yale Courses
  • Educação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::Economia::Teoria Monetária e Financeira
  • Economics
To learn some concepts on Economics
Duration: 1 h, 17 min, 18 s. To hear this resource its necessary the instalation of Quick time. Available at: <>
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Appears in Collections:MEC - Objetos Educacionais (BIOE) - OE

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