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Repeated games: cooperation vs. the end game [Game theory]
Polak, Ben
  • Educação Superior::Engenharias::Engenharia de Produção
  • Educação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::Economia
  • Presents part of course, Game theory , when Professor Polak discusses repeated games, aiming to unpack the intuition that the promise of rewards and the threat of punishment in the future of a relationship can provide incentives for good behavior today. Shows the real-world problems of a lame duck leader and of maintaining incentives for those close to retirement. But it is possible to sustain good behavior in early stages of some repeated games (even if they are only played a few times) provided the stage games have two or more equilibria to be used as rewards and punishments. This may require us to play bad equilibria tomorrow. We relate this to the trade off between ex ante and ex post efficiency in the law. In the finish, we play a game in which the players do not know when the game will end, and we start to consider strategies for this potentially infinitely repeated game
Issue Date: 
  • 26-Nov-2007
  • 6-Apr-2010
  • 6-May-2010
  • 6-May-2010
  • 6-May-2010
Yale University, Open Yale Courses
  • Educação Superior::Engenharias::Engenharia de Produção::Teoria dos Jogos
  • Educação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::Economia::Economia Geral
  • Incentive
  • Punishment
  • Cooperation
To understand the repeated games
Duration: 1 h 15 min, 18 s. To hear this resource its necessary the instalation of Quick time. Available at: <>
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Appears in Collections:MEC - Objetos Educacionais (BIOE) - OE

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