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- Asymmetric information: silence, signaling and suffering education [Game theory]
- Polak, Ben
- Educação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::Economia
- Educação Superior::Engenharias::Engenharia de Produção
- Presents part of course, Game theory , when Professor Polak compares two settings with asymmetric information; one side of a game knows something that the other side does not. Shows how always interpret attempts to communicate or signal such information taking into account the incentives of the person doing the signaling. The costly signals can sometimes provide incentives for agents with different information to distinguish themselves. Considers how the education system can allow future workers to signal their abilities
- Yale University, Open Yale Courses
- Educação Superior::Engenharias::Engenharia de Produção::Teoria dos Jogos
- Educação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::Economia::Economia Geral
- To show and understand the interpretation attempts to communicate or signal the incentives of the person doing the signaling
- Duration: 1 h 10 min, 36 s. To hear this resource its necessary the instalation of Quick time. Available at: <http://www.apple.com/pt/quicktime/>
- Yale University 2009. Some rights reserved. Unless otherwise indicated in the applicable Credits section of certain lecture pages, all content on this web site is licensed under a Creative Commons License. Please refer to the Credits section to determine whether third-party restrictions on the use of content apply
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