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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://acervodigital.unesp.br/handle/unesp/369762
Title: 
Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats [Game theory]
Author(s): 
Polak, Ben
Language: 
eng
Description: 
  • Presents a class with professor at Yale University, Ben Polak. In this class professor Polak discusses Zermelo's theorem using examples of games like chess and tic-tac-toe and discusses too an example that involves a threat that is believed in an equilibrium but does not seem credible
  • Educação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::Economia
Issue Date: 
  • 1-Apr-2010
  • 29-Oct-2007
  • 6-May-2010
  • 6-May-2010
  • 6-May-2010
Publisher: 
Yale University, Open Yale Courses
Keywords: 
  • Zermelo's theorem
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Educação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::Economia::Métodos Quantitativos em Economia
  • Educação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::Economia::Teoria Econômica
Notes: 
To learn about the idea of backward induction
Credits: 
Duration: 1 h, 12 min, 38 s. To hear this resource its necessary the instalation of Quick time. Available at: <http://www.apple.com/pt/quicktime/>
Source: 
http://objetoseducacionais2.mec.gov.br/handle/mec/13887
URI: 
http://acervodigital.unesp.br/handle/unesp/369762
Rights: 
Yale University 2009. Some rights reserved. Unless otherwise indicated in the applicable Credits section of certain lecture pages, all content on this web site is licensed under a Creative Commons License. Please refer to the Credits section to determine whether third-party restrictions on the use of content apply
Type: 
áudio
Appears in Collections:MEC - Objetos Educacionais (BIOE) - OE

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