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- Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats [Game theory]
- Polak, Ben
- Presents a class with professor at Yale University, Ben Polak. In this class professor Polak discusses Zermelo's theorem using examples of games like chess and tic-tac-toe and discusses too an example that involves a threat that is believed in an equilibrium but does not seem credible
- Educação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::Economia
- Yale University, Open Yale Courses
- Zermelo's theorem
- Nash equilibrium
- Educação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::Economia::Métodos Quantitativos em Economia
- Educação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::Economia::Teoria Econômica
- To learn about the idea of backward induction
- Duration: 1 h, 12 min, 38 s. To hear this resource its necessary the instalation of Quick time. Available at: <http://www.apple.com/pt/quicktime/>
- Yale University 2009. Some rights reserved. Unless otherwise indicated in the applicable Credits section of certain lecture pages, all content on this web site is licensed under a Creative Commons License. Please refer to the Credits section to determine whether third-party restrictions on the use of content apply
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